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supported on the theory of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV,
section 2, which outlaws discrimination
by one state against citizens of another.
The questions raised by the case fall more
within the 'scope of the decisions in
Ward, McCready, Toomer, and Blake,
rather than Thompson and Green. Under

the former cases it would appear that a
proper ratio must be established between
the percentage of taxes paid and the
benefits received. However, unlike the
earlier cases, we are here involved not
with privileges and immunities that arise
from United States citizenship but those
that are specifically provided by a particular state for its own citizens.
The fundamental significance of the
instant case is in the fact that it established a workable test to be used when
applying the equal protection clause of

Applicability of Sixth Amendment
Guarantees to Military Proceedings

Defendant appealed from an order of
the United States District Court of Kansas dismissing his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus which had been brought
on the grounds that, at his special courtmartial, he had been denied his sixth
and fifth amendment guarantees as well
as those of military due process in that
he was assigned a non-legally trained officer in response to his request for quali-

the fourteenth amendment to constitutional challenges against residency requirements for welfare benefits. The
classification and purpose of the statute
are now to be investigated. Such a test
appears to validly protect the rights of the
individual because, if properly applied,
the actual intent of an applicant will be
investigated before any decision as to the
availability of benefits is determined.
However, the problem which remains is
whether or not the state may validly
restrict aid to its own domiciliaries. In
light of the greater burdens that are now
being placed upon state treasuries to
provide adequate services to residents of
a particular state, it would seem that a
legitimate requirement may be legislated,
i.e., one which reasonably protects the
state against the fraud of an applicant
but legitimately balances against this the
true intent of the individual.

fled counsel.' The United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in affirming
the dismissal of the petition, held that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights
had not been denied since the crime for
which the accused had been charged was
equivalent to a misdemeanor at civil law
and the sixth amendment's assistance of
counsel provision had not, as yet, been

10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964) (Article 27(c)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ]).
1

14
interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court as applying to misdemeanors.
Furthermore, the Court found the accused not to have been deprived of a fair
trial in violation of the fifth amendment
since, as required by statute, trial and
defense counsel were equally qualified
in terms of legal training. Kennedy v.
Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.
1967).
Twelve days later, in another case,
the United States Court of Military Appeals reached an apparently conflicting
conclusion. There, the accused was tried
and convicted by a general court-martial.
At the custodial interrogation, the defendant requested that counsel be appointed to represent him but the Staff
Judge Advocate refused to appoint an
attorney at the investigatory stage, noting that the defendant had the right to
retain civilian counsel at his own expense. The defendant was otherwise informed of all his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The
Court of Military Appeals, in reversing
petitioner's conviction, recognized that
members of the armed services are not
automatically deprived of their Bill of
Rights guarantees and held that the principles enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court with respect to the right
to counsel are of constitutional dimension
and hence applicable to military interrogations of criminal suspects.
Pursuant
to these principles, the Court found that
the defendant had the right to be represented by appointed counsel at the pretrial interrogation.
United States v.
Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R.
249 (1967).
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Congress was given the power to
"make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces ' 2 to insure supremacy of the civil
government over the military.
This
grant, in conjunction with the wording
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that no person
shall answer for an infamous crime without indictment by a grand jury "except
in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger" 3 is generally viewed as the source
of authority for court-martial proceedings.' Given this power to regulate the
armed forces, Congress took the position
that it was not limited by any of the
Bill of Rights guarantees, 5 a position not
without strong historical support.
All the early American Articles of
War,' which were derived from the British Articles of War, 7 contain no provision
for even allowing the presence of counsel
at court-martial proceedings. Not until
the American Articles of War of 18068
can anything resembling a right of counsel
be found. Article 69 of this Act provided that the judge advocate as prosecutor for the United States "shall so far
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 185-86 (1962).
3U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4See, e.g., W. WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 48 (2d ed. 1920).
5Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen
Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
127, 128 (1964).
6Reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 4, at 953.
7Id. at 931.
8 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, arts. 1-101, 2
Stat. 359.
2
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consider himself as counsel for the prisoner . . . as to object to any leading
question to any of the witnesses or any
question to the prisoner, the answer to
which might tend to criminate himself. . . ." 9
Army Regulations in 1835 provided
that while an attorney was allowed to be
present, he could not directly participate
in the proceedings. 10 As an early treatise writer noted, "counsel are not to...
offer the slightest remark, much less to
lead or argue. . . . [A] lawyer . . . is
tolerated, as a friend of the person to
assist him by advice in preparing questions
for witnesses, in taking notes and shaping
his defence.""'
Since Congress' power to create such
tribunals arose independently of the judicial articles of the Constitution, a
court-martial was not considered a court
as that term is understood in civil phraseology and thus was not to be limited by
12
the provisions of the sixth amendment.
While Blackstone's statement that "he
puts not off the citizen when he enters
the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that
he makes himself for a while a soldier"' 13
remains true, the rights of the individual
citizen always give way to the necessity
9 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, art. 69, 2 Stat.

367.
10 ARMY REG. art. XXX § 34, at 96 (1835).
"1 A. MACOMB,

THE PRACTICE OF COURTS

MAR-

TIAL §§ 43, 93 (1840) reprinted in Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The
Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38

of enforcing military discipline. Indeed,
Chief Justice Warren recently stated that
the military establishment has been given
broad power to deal with its own personnel because
courts are ill-equipped to determine the
impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have. Many of the problems of
the military society are, in a sense, alien
to the problems with which the judiciary
14
is trained to deal.
This "hands-off" doctrine, which has
continued basically intact, was first enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Ex parte Vallandigham."5 There,
petitioner, a civilian, had made a speech
critical of the government's handling of
the Civil War. The speech was found to
be in violation of a regulation promulgated by the head of the area military
department. In refusing to review the
petitioner's conviction, the Court held
that it had no power to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military commission appointed by an officer commanding
a military department since such an application was not from a suit "in law or
equity within the meaning of . . . the
3d article of the Constitution. Nor is a
military commission a court within the
meaning of the 14th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789."6
Hence, the Supreme Court seemingly
divested itself of any power it might have
had, either constitutional or statutory, to

(1958).
12

W.

WINTHROP,

MILITARY

LAW

AND

DENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920).
13 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

dell ed.).

PRECE-

408 (Wen-

'4

Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,

37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962).
15 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
I1d. at 251.

14
inquire into the judgments of military
tribunals. However, three years later, a
nearly identical fact pattern arose except
that a peacetime background now prevailed. The Supreme Court, in Ex parte
Milligan,1 7 granted an application for a
writ of habeas corpus requested by a
civilian tried by a military tribunal for
promoting rebellion in an area that had
not been and was not being threatened
with enemy occupation. Although discipline is a necessity for achieving military efficiency and, therefore, Congress
can prescribe modes of trial as it sees fit,
nevertheless all civilians are guaranteed
the right of trial in their respective state
courts where such are open and operating. At first glance, these cases seemed
contradictory but are reconcilable since
in Vallandigham the Supreme Court said
it did not have jurisdiction to inquire
into the merits whereas in Milligan it
felt that the military had no jurisdiction
over the person sentenced.
Refinement of the jurisdictional basis
for inquiring into military proceedings
came in Ex parte Reed.' There, the defendant was tried by a general courtmartial, found guilty of malfeasance, and
had sentence imposed. The reviewing authority demanded that a higher sentence
be provided and this was done. In affirming the lower court's denial of a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
because the military court had jurisdiction
over the person, the cause, and the sentence imposed, it could look no further

17

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).

Is 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
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into the record.' 9
The principle that judgments of a military tribunal cannot be collaterally attacked once the requisite jurisdictional
requirements have been satisfied continued unchallenged until the World War
II era.20 At that time a series of Supreme
Court decisions enlarging upon the applicability of the sixth amendment as
applied to civilians as well as certain
extra-judicial factors led to attempts to
either expand the classical test of jurisdictional inquiry by the civil judiciary or
to internally reform military due process.
In 1932, the Supreme Court decided
Powell v. Alabama,21 in which it held
that in a capital case arising in a state
court where the defendant is indigent
and incapable of effectively defending
himself, the court must assign counsel
whether requested or not. The reasoning
of Powell was followed by Johnson v.
Zerbst,22 where
the defendant was

was done . . we must presume
was properly done. If error was committed in
the rightful exercise of authority, we cannot
correct it." Id. at 23. Accord, Keyes v. United
States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883)
(habeas corpus
denied where the general court-martial had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements even though
one of its members was a witness for the proscution); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890)
(grant of habeas corpus reversed where the
military court had met jurisdiction even though
it incorrectly interpreted a statute).
20
See, e.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296,
304 (1911), cited with approval in United States
ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 344
(1922):
'To those in the military . . . the
military law is due process. The decision, therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the
scope of its lawful powers cannot be reviewed
or set aside by the courts."
21 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22304 U.S. 458 (1938).
129"Whatever
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charged with feloniously possessing and
uttering counterfeit money. The Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment
meant that, in federal courts, counsel
must be provided for those unable to
employ such counsel unless the right is
competently and intelligently waived. The
Court concluded that failure to provide
such counsel would create a jurisdictional
bar to conviction and sentencing which
may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.
Not long after these decisions, the lower federal courts began to apply the new
standard in reversing a number of courtmartial convictions 23 despite the fact that
the Supreme Court had held in Betts v.
Brady 24 that the sixth amendment did
not require the states to furnish indigent
defendants with counsel. In effect, it
seemed that a deprivation of the "Assistance of Counsel" guarantee added a new
element to the jurisdictional inquiry into
court-martial proceedings. The absence
of such assistance would apparently have
25
created a bar to prosecution.
26
In 1950, however, in Hiatt v. Brown,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional limitations on judicial inquiry into
military matters. There, the lower court
was presented with a record replete with
the errors of reliance on inapplicable law,

token defense, and conviction for murder
without proof of malice, premeditation or
deliberation. 27 In granting habeas corpus
relief, the lower court applied due process
under civilian standards holding that were
it not to do so the fifth amendment guarantees would no longer apply in federal
courts. In reversing, the Supreme Court
restated the classical view that the civilian courts can exercise no supervisory
power over court-martial proceedings,
that any errors committed are for the
military to arrest and that the single in28
quiry must remain jurisdiction.
The door to the courts being effectively
closed to any relief on a constitutional
basis, extra-judicial events required a
modification in the traditional theory of
military autonomy. Soldiers returning
from the war told of unnecessary displays
of arbitrariness by their superiors. More
importantly, the scope of our military
strength had increased tremendously since
colonial days. Every male was now a
potential member of the armed forces
with time spent on active enlistment and
on reserve duty consuming significant portions of their lives.2 9 Thus, the Articles

27

28

175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949).
Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1950),

citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S.
2:See, e.g., Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp.

823 (D. Kan. 1947) (inexperienced officers
appointed counsel); Shapiro v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (failure to
provide counsel).
24 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 127,
25

131 (1964).
26339 U.S. 103

(1950).

147

(1890)

and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, giving the right
to punish "Offenses against the Law of Nations,"
Congress could by military tribunals punish
foreign officers for war crimes).
21 For an analysis of the events leading up to
the expansion of servicemen's rights, see White,
The Background and the Problem, 35 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 197 (1961); Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.
181, 187-88 (1961).

L. REV.
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of War of 1806,30 which had governed
the discipline of American soldiers, with
only minor revisions in 1916 31 and
1920,32 was replaced in 1950 by the
3
Uniform Code of Military Justice.1
Under the UCMJ three kinds of courtsmartial exist. The first is a general courtmartial which is composed of not less
3
than five members and a law officer. '
This court has the power to adjudge
any punishment including death when
specifically authorized and, under the law
of war, may try any person subject to
trial by military tribunal and adjudge any
punishment permitted by the law of
35
war.
The second type of court-martial, designated as special, consists of not less
than three members and may impose a
bad conduct discharge as well as any
other penalty not forbidden, except death,
dishonorable discharge, imprisonment for
more than six months, hard labor without confinement for over three months,
and certain salary forfeitures beyond a
stated maximum.3 6 The penalties which
a special court-martial may impose are
thus limited to the length of sentence

30 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, arts. 1-101, 2

Stat. 359.

Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, arts. 1-121, 39
Stat. 650.
32Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, arts. 1-121, 41
Stat. 787.
33 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, arts. 1-139, 64
Stat. 144, as amended, Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, arts. 1-121, 70A Stat. 78, now, 10
U.S.C. §§801-972 (1964).
"410 U.S.C. §816(1) (1964). For the duties
of the law officer, see 10 U.S.C. § 826(a)-(b)
(1964).
31

35

10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).

31

10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).

which may be imposed for conviction of
37
a misdemeanor at civil law.

For each general and special courtmartial, the authority convening the court
shall detail trial and defense counsel
which, at a general court-martial, must
be a judge advocate or a law specialist
who is a graduate of an accredited law
school or member of the federal bar or
bar of the highest court of a state and
must be certified as competent by his
respective

Judge

Advocate

General. 38

The UCMJ also provides that in the case
of a special court-martial, neither trial
nor defense counsel need be of that class
that can be qualified in a general courtmartial, but if the trial counsel is qualified
to act before a general court-martial or
is qualified to act in all respects before
a general court-martial except for a lack
of certification, then defense counsel must
9

be similarly qualified.3

The last type of court-martial is the
summary court-martial and consists of
one commissioned officer with authority
over all persons subject to this chapter
for any non-capital offense, except of-

37Compare 10 U.S.C. §819 (1964) with N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 55.102(e).
's10 U.S.C. §827(b) (1964).
1910 U.S.C. §827(c)(1)-(2) (1964). When
the prosecutor is not qualified to practice before a general court-martial, or qualified but

not certified, compare Application of Stapley,
246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) (appointment of non-legally trained counsel at special
court-martial held inconsistent with the sixth
amendment) with Le Ballister v. Warden, 247
F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965) (sixth amendment

inapplicable since any existing right to counsel
arises from the power of Congress and therefore
legally trained counsel not necessary at special
court-martial proceedings).
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ficers, cadets, and midshipmen. However,
no person may be tried before it over
his objection unless he has chosen this
forum in lieu of a commanding officer's
nonjudicial punishment. 40 The penalties
that may be imposed are more severely
limited, with confinement and pay forfeitures approximately between one-third
and one-sixth of those imposable by a
special court-martial.4 1 As previously
mentioned, a commanding officer may
impose a nonjudicial punishment which
approximately equals, in severity, though
in greater specificity, the penalties that
may be imposed by summary courts42
martial.
The UCMJ also provides that no serviceman may be tried by a court-martial
any member of which is his junior, nor
may any member of any court-martial be
an accuser, witness for the prosecution, or
have acted as investigation officer or as
counsel in the same case.4 3 Compulsory
self-incrimination is prohibited in the
court-martial and in the pre-trial interrogation and no person is allowed to interrogate without informing the accused
of the nature of the accusation against
him; that the accused need make no
statement; and that any statement made
may be used against him in evidence.
Any statement elicited in violation of
44
this article is inadmissible evidence.
Finally, according to statute, the accused
must be represented by counsel in his
defense before a general or special court-

40 10 U.S.C. §820 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 820 (1964).

41

42 10 U.S.C. §815 (1964).
43 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (1964).
44 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).

martial which may consist of either civilian counsel if provided by him, or by
military counsel of his own choosing if
reasonably available, or by the defense
4
counsel detailed under 10 U.S.C. § 827. 5
It is to be perceived, therefore, that in
1950, military process had far surpassed
civilian due process as applied to the
states. Thereafter, decisions of the Supreme Court expanding inquiry into military matters and applying the sixth
amendment to the states tended to close
the gap between military and civil justice.
The landmark case in this area is Burns
v. Wilson.4 6 There, petitioners were tried
separately before a general court-martial,
found guilty of murder, and sentenced to
death. After all military remedies were
exhausted, petitioners applied for and
were denied habeas corpus relief in the
district court on the ground that the
military tribunal had jurisdiction in the
traditional sense. The court of appeals
affirmed, but only after reviewing the evidence. In affirming the lower court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court held that the "military
courts, like the state courts, have the
same responsibilities as do the federal
courts to protect a person from a viola-

U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964).
Compare the
language of that statute requiring that the defendant be represented by assigned defense
counsel with Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
45 10

Criminal Procedure requiring that counsel be
appointed only if defendant is indigent. For a
concise discussion of the absolute burden on the
military to appoint counsel see Quinn, The
United States Court of Military Appeals and
Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.

225, 237 (1961).
46346 U.S. 137 (1953).

14
tion of his constitutional rights." 47 Where
the military had given a fair consideration to all the claims raised by the petitioner, it was not up to a federal civil
court to re-evaluate. The dissent argued
that it was not enough to determine that
the military had considered the claims
where it was clear that an incorrect result
had been reached.
The significance of this case is the
addition of a new element to the traditional jurisdictional inquiry. Now the
federal courts can inquire into whether
the military has given a fair hearing to
claims raised by the accused. Consequently, the Court of Military Appeals has
generally taken it upon itself to quickly
follow suit with respect to the new pronouncements concerning individual rights
by the Supreme Court. For example, in
4
Chandler v. Fretag,'
a state criminal action wherein petitioner had been denied a
continuance in response to his request to
obtain counsel, the Supreme Court, distinguishing Betts and citing Powell, held
that regardless of whether the sixth amendment required that counsel be appointed,
at the very least his right to be heard
through his own counsel was unqualified.
This was soon followed by the Court of
Military Appeals' decision of United
States v. Gunnels.49 At a preliminary investigation, the defendant had been informed of the charges against him and
of his privilege against self-incrimination,
but, upon application to the staff judge ad-
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vocate, he was refused any advice regarding the right to counsel. In reversing the
conviction by the general court-martial,
the Court of Military Appeals held that
while the right of assigned counsel exists
only in criminal proceedings, as distinguished from an investigation, a suspect
has the right to be given legal advice by
the staff judge advocate, or in the alternate, by civilian counsel. Since the accused was given no advice whatsoever
regarding the right to counsel, this latter
alternative of advice by civilian counsel
was, in effect, unknown to the defendant.
United States v. Jacoby 50 stands on a
par with Burns for the sheer breadth of
its statements as to the applicability of
the Bill of Rights to the military. There,
the defendant had been convicted at a
special court-martial of uttering worthless
checks on the basis of written interrogatories without the opportunity of confrontation of witnesses and sentenced, in
part, to a bad conduct discharge. In reversing the intermediate review board,
the Court of Military Appeals held that the
taking of depositions without the presence
of the accused's counsel was a violation
of the sixth amendment. It noted that
"it is apparent that the protections in the
Bill of Rights, except those which are
expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of
our armed forces." " Even more interesting, however, is the statement by the
court that "the historical development of
military practice and subsequent enact-

47 Id.

at 142.
,48 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
49 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
Accord, United States v. Rose, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).

U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
51Jd. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
50 11
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ments of Congress have little bearing on
the contemporaneous meaning of the
Sixth Amendment." 52
Three years later the Supreme Court
took further steps in advancing the civil
right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright,58 an indigent defendant was convicted of a felony by a state court over
his objection that counsel was not appointed to represent him. In overruling
Betts, the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment's assistance of counsel
provision was an essential requisite of a
fair trial and as such made obligatory on
54
the states by the fourteenth amendment.
Subsequently, the Court of Military
Appeals decided United States v. Culp 5
This case involved a defendant who was
tried by a special court-martial and who,
upon his plea of guilty, was sentenced,
in part, to a bad conduct discharge. The

52 Id. at 433, 29 C.M.R. at 249.
A strong dissent stated that if "the framers of the Constitution entrusted to Congress the task of striking a precise balance between the rights of men
in the service and the overriding demands of

discipline and duty

. . .

we must not reject the

expression of Congress merely because we believe the civilian system offers a better scale."
Id. at 441, 29 C.M.R. at 257.
53 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51 See aiso
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), requiring counsel on an appeal
as of right. Clearly a person may appeal from
a military court-martial as a matter of right.
Once the court-martial's convening authority has
taken final action, the entire record of every
general court-martial case and that of every
special court-martial approving a bad conduct
discharge is sent to the appropriate Judge Advocate General to be reviewed by a board of
review. 10 U.S.C. §865(a)-(b) (1964). All
other special and summary court proceedings are
reviewed by a judge advocate as prescribed by
regulation. 10 U.S.C. § 865(c) (1964).
-'5
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).

board of review set aside the sentence on
the determination that the defendant's
plea of guilty was improvident and that
the defendant had been deprived of his
sixth amendment rights where they had
not been intelligently waived, and that
defense counsel had consisted of noncertified officers. Although the Court of
Military Appeals reversed the decision of
the board, the three opinions filed in support of the reversal differed as to reasoning. One judge argued that, in light of
the common law at the time of its adoption and its subsequent history, the sixth
amendment's assistance of counsel provision has always been inapplicable to
trials by court-martial. Since the sixth
amendment did not apply, the judge then
directed his reasoning to the qualifications
of counsel as set forth in the UCMJ and
found that the defense counsel met the
requirements of articles 27 and 38(b)
of the UCMJ.
The Chief Judge argued that the sixth
amendment is applicable to trials by
either general or special courts-martial
but that such requirements were satisfied
by appointment of counsel pursuant to
skill
the UCMJ since presumptive
matched actual performance so that competent counsel was a reality. In addition,
he noted that in all cases where a special
court-martial had imposed a bad conduct
discharge, an automatic review was provided with the possibility existing of a
further review by the Court of Military
Appeals.
The third judge, concurring in the
opinion of the Chief Judge that the sixth
amendment was applicable to military
proceedings, felt that the defendant here
had not been deprived of his rights since
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he had chosen his own counsel. He also
questioned the desirability of continuing
to permit non-lawyers to practice before
tribunals where bad conduct discharges
could be imposed. Thus, although the
court recognized the applicability of the
sixth amendment to military proceedings,
the court failed to designate the standard
to be applied.56
Further questions relating to assistance
of counsel were raised by the Supreme
5 7
Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.
The Court held that where the petitioner
had been taken into custody and had
begun to become the focal point of inquiry as to the commission of a crime,
had asked for and been denied the right
to consult with his own attorney and had
not been warned by the police of his
right to remain silent, the accused had
been denied the assistance of counsel.
The Court of Military Appeals, in
United States v. Wimberly,5" refused to
follow Escobedo and instead adhered to
the traditional voluntary-involuntary approach regarding confessions, as advocated by the dissent in Escobedo. Here
the court found a confession to be voluntary although made only four days after
another confession which was found to
be involuntary. Between the first and
second confessions, the defendant had
been advised of all his rights, but, due to
his ignorance as to the inadmissibility of
his first confession, reconfessed when requested. Over the defendant's objections,
his conviction by a general court-martial
was affirmed. The Court of Military Ap-

peals cited Escobedo as establishing nothing new for the military, at least in regard to the admissibility of statements
made after the police had denied a request to consult with counsel. As to custodial interrogations where the accused
has not requested counsel, the court recognized that there were currently varied
interpretations of Escobedo in this respect 59 and concluded that nothing indicated "that the only feasible way to give
maximum effect to the Constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel is that
the accused have counsel beside him during police questioning." 60
Some questions left in doubt by
Escobedo were settled by Miranda v.
Arizona.61 Here the Supreme Court held
that prior to any custodial interrogation,
the accused must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement made can be used against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed,
unless such right be waived voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. It should be
noted that the Supreme Court there cited
with approval the self-incrimination provisions of the UCMJ, 62 the United States
v. Gunnels 63 and United States v. Rose 64
decisions
for the proposition
that
"Id]enial of the right to consult counsel

. 9Lane, Miranda in Uniform, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
10, 1967, at 1, col. 3-4.
60 United States v. Wimberly, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3,
10, 36 C.M.R. 159, 166 (1966).
61384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6,2 10 U.S.C. § 831(b)
(1964).

8 U.S.C.M.A.

130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).

. c,See note 39, supra.

63

57 378

See text accompanying note 49, supra.
64 8 U.S.C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).

U.S. 478 (1964).
58 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966).
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during interrogation has also been proscribed by military tribunals." (5
6
In Kennedy v. Commandant,
" the instant case, the defendant appealed from
the denial of a writ of habeas corpus
brought on the ground that the military
courts lost jurisdiction in imposing a sentence in a special court-martial where the
accused was represented by non-legally
trained counsel. Aside from this sixth
amendment claim, the defendant argued
that a fair trial had been denied in that,
since he was unable to afford civilian
counsel, the UCMJ provision which permits the accused to hire civilian counsel
at his own expense67 invidiously discriminated against the poor in violation
of the fifth amendment.
Since the defendant had conceded that
the elements of jurisdiction in the classical sense existed, the Court had to consider only the question of whether the
accused was per se deprived of any constitutionally guaranteed right. Historically
it found no support for applying the sixth
amendment to military prosecutions and
saw no need to determine its current
applicability. Moreover, while the crime
was one of moral turpitude, the penalty
was equivalent to a misdemeanor at civil
law. Since the applicability of the sixth
amendment in such cases was still an
open question, 8 the Court felt it need
65Miranda

v. Arizona,

384 U.S. at 489 &

n. 63.
F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
§ 838(b) (1964).
68 See the opinion of Justice Fortas, dissenting
from the denial of a writ of certiorari in
Heller v. Connecticut, # 115 B73 CCH (1967)
stating the issue to be: "whether we should
now hold that the constitutional guarantees of
counsel applies to the present case and to
66377
67

10 U.S.C.

not now decide whether such amendment
was applicable to the military, since in
any event the UCMJ complied fully with
that amendment's provisions. Furthermore, the Court noted that the trial counsel was equally trained, that the sentencing power of special courts-martial was
limited, and that every officer must be
familiar with the UCMJ and the Manual
for Courts-Martial such that the fifth
amendment was satisfied. 69
Finally, the Court found that petitioner
had not been denied military due process
since the counsel appointed and the trial
received had already been deemed to satisfy the sixth and fifth amendments respectively. Satisfaction of these constitutional provisions ipso facto precluded any
possibility that he could have been prejudiced by his inability to obtain private
counsel.70
In United States v. Tempia,71 the accused was tried by a general court-martial
and sentenced, in part, to a bad-conduct
discharge. Prior to custodial interrogaother relatively 'minor' offenses or misdemean-

ors carrying significant penalties for their violation." Id. at 74. Thus, a number of opposite

conclusions have been reached in this area.
Those arguing for the applicability state that
it is implicit in Gideon (see, e.g., Harvey v.
Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965)) and

those holding the contrary argue that it would
place an intolerable burden on the legal structure (see, e.g., Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1154,
397 S.W.2d 365 (1965)).
The relationship of this conflict to military proceedings lies, of course, in the area of special
courts-martial whose scope is limited to penal-

ties that would be meted out for misdemeanors
at civil law. See note 37, supra.
60 Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 343-

44 (10th Cir. 1967).

701d. at 344.
71

16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
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tion, defendant had sought legal advice
from the Staff Judge Advocate. The advice was given, but the Staff Judge Advocate refused to enter into an attorneyclient relationship since such would deprive him from acting in his official
capacity. Defendant was told that he had
the right to retain civilian counsel at his
own expense, that no military lawyer
would represent him during the investigatory stages, but that he would be furnished military counsel if charges were
preferred. At the interrogation held immediately thereafter, the defendant confessed.
The Court premised its reversal on the
ground that, even though military law has
a separate existence, members of the
armed services, by their mere status, are
not deprived of all the protections of the
Bill of Rights. The Court reasoned that
constitutional safeguards, unless expressly
or impliedly inapplicable, encompassed
the military and that since Miranda laid
down principles constitutional in scope,
2
it was binding on the military.1
Pursuant thereto, it found these standards not to have been satisfied where the
accused had been told that no lawyer
would be appointed to represent him at
the custodial interrogation and that the
availability of consultation with private
attorneys was limited to attorneys whom
he could employ at his own expense. The
burden was now on the government to
provide counsel for the accused, not only
at the court-martial but also at the custodial interrogation. While it noted that
Miranda allowed for other procedures
that are at least as effective in warning
72

Id. at 634-35.
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the accused of his right to silence, it
found that procedures heretofore employed were not such equivalent methods.

73

A concurring opinion reiterated the
fact that decisions by the Supreme Court
of constitutional import, of which Miranda was one, are binding on even military
tribunals, but further added that any
denial of the accused's rights are subject
to review by habeas corpus proceedings
in civil court.

74

The Chief Judge, in his dissent, noted
that Miranda had been, in part, based
upon the military procedure relating to
warning of rights and right to counsel at
trials. Even if this were not the case, the
military procedures were equivalently effective means, and that even though the
attorney-client
relationship
was
not
formed, the defendant was told of all his
legal rights and right to counsel which
is all that any attorney can do.
Tempia unequivocally adds two constitutional rights to those already possessed
by servicemen. As enunciated in Miranda, as of June 13, 1966, the accused who
has been made the subject of custodial
interrogation has the right to the presence of an attorney and, secondly, the
right to have counsel provided if he is
indigent.
At this point, the clarity of the holding
in Tempia ends. Questions now arise as
to what the Court meant by counselwhether it is either a lawyer or a nonlegally trained officer and whether the
decision was intended to apply only in

7 ld. at 639-40.
7Id. at 640. See 28 U.S.C. §2241

(1964).
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the case of a general court-martial. With
respect to both questions, the Court merely stated that past procedures were defective, citing Miranda, but did not elaborate as to whether an attorney, if not
certified as competent or legally trained,
would be sufficient to satisfy the sixth
amendment in the event the defendant
was subject to trial by general courtmartial. In all likelihood, advice by such
counsel would be insufficient. The question now arises whether such advice
would be sufficient where the accused is
subject to trial by a special court-martial,
which has the authority to levy punishment equivalent to that of a misdemeanor
at civil law.
Thus, while the Court has determined
that the sixth amendment applies to custodial interrogation, it has failed to set
forth what constitutes compliance as to
the type of representation required, especially in regard to a special courtmartial proceeding.
Kennedy, on the
other hand, while professing uncertainty
as to the applicability of the sixth amendment, still managed to set forth a standard that would satisfy the amendment.
Although it was a special court-martial
with the right to counsel at a military
trial that was this Court's focal point of
inquiry, it is significant that it held that
the UCMJ provisions for qualification of
counsel do comply with the sixth amendment whereas previous decisions either
held that the sixth amendment was inapplicable to the military or that the
sixth amendment is applicable and its
requirements were not met by the UCMJ.
An apparent conflict between the two
cases seemingly exists. In Kennedy it
was held that no constitutional rights are

infringed by the refusal to permit the
accused to obtain his own legally trained
counsel when he is able to pay for it.
In Tempia, which concerned appointment
at the pre-trial level, it was specifically
held that failure to appoint counsel for
an indigent was violative of the Constitution. However, the two cases are distinguishable in so far as Tempia is concerned with the otherwise outright denial
of such a right whereas Kennedy relates
to the obtaining of possibly superior
counsel where the right to appointed
counsel already existed.
A more important issue raised by these
decisions is whether felons and misdemeanants are to be afforded the same
measure of legal assistance both at the
trial and the investigatorial phase. Kennedy answered the question in the negative, stating that appointment of equally
competent but non-legally trained counsel
under the UCMJ fully satisfied all of the
accused's rights. This broad language
would seem to be diametrically opposed
to the Tempia holding that an accused's
rights to the assistance of counsel do not
end with the UCMJ; constitutional mandates require their extension into the investigatorial stage. A reconciliation might
lie in the fact that despite Kennedy's
broad language as to the completeness
of the accused's rights under the UCMJ,
it was dealing solely with the trial itself.
Its value as precedent for the theory that
misdemeanants are not entitled to the
same counsel rights as felons on trial is
therefore enhanced.
Thus, it would appear that Kennedy
provides a necessary supplement to the
principles expounded in Tempia so that
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in concert they make significant strides
in the application and clarification of the
sixth amendment to the armed forces. As
a result of these cases, at the very least,
the accused in the military has the right
to counsel, either retained or appointed, at
both the investigatory and trial stage. The

remaining questions posed are whether
this right is also applicable to special
courts-martial, and, if so, is counsel in
the sense of a lawyer, as distinguished
from an officer familiar with the UCMJ
and the Manual for Courts-Martial,
required.

CHURCH - STATE

nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
Tennessee has no express reference in
the preamble to its constitution, but submits various dates in the language, "the
year of our Lord."
No references whatsoever may be
found in the New Hampshire or Oregon
constitutions.
Vermont's constitution has no preamble.
[It is important to note that many of
the prohibitions and guarantees mentioned
above, which may not appear in the constitutions of the several states, are included among subsequent legislative
enactments. See, e.g., bracketed notation to note 1].

(Continued)

Ariz. I 7; Ind. 1 8; Ore. 1 7; Wash.
1 6; Ky. 232.
14. Unlike Maryland, eleven states
provide in their constitutions that religious tests for jurors are forbidden. Cf.
Md. DR. 36.
Ariz. II 12; Cal. I 4; Mo. I 5; N.D.
I 4; Ore. I 6; Tenn. I 6; Utah I 4;
Wash. I 11; W. Va. III 11; Wyo.
I 18; N.M. VII 3.
15. The constitutions of forty-six (46)
of the remaining states in the Union have
reference to a Supreme Being in the
preamble:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, [Maryland], Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-

THE GHETTO LAWYER

THE GHETTO LAWYER
(Continued)

in revamping outmoded legal procedures
generally and in encouraging more widespread use of group practice for those
well above the poverty line but too poor
to afford effective and continuing legal
representation."6
Today, it is generally conceded that
though indigents cannot even begin to
think about hiring a lawyer, middle-income people in the big cities, especially,
will also think twice before doing so.

36 Paulsen,

Services-l,
(1965).

The Expanding Horizons of Legal
67 W. VA. L. REv. 267, 277

LAY ATTORNEYS
(Continued)

an affirmative decision that it also be
affirmed on appeal except in those cases
where the facts in no way support the
decision of the court of first instance or
where there has been a gross violation of
procedural law. They argue that the
court of first instance is better prepared
to grant a just decision because it has
had all the parties before it. And ultimately, who is to say that three prudent
men in Pittsburgh are more or less wise
than three prudent men in Chicago, New
York or San Francisco in reaching a

The cost of an urban lawyer's services,
except for real estate closings where
cash in hand or a new home tend to
give a glow to the transaction, or personal
injury litigation, where almost everyone
recovers, for most citizens is usually
disproportionate to the results achieved,
and, therefore, a luxury item.
The fault in most cases is not attributable to the lawyer himself. He has no
choice but to charge for the many hours
he spends in a lower court, not to speak
of the discourtesies he endures, waiting
for a calendar call on a single claim
worth one or two thousand dollars. The
fault, instead, lies with an archaic and
rigid system which, in practice, imposes
a sacrosanct attorney-client relationship
on all except the truly affluent.

decision on the validity of a marriage. If
we are not prepared to change Canon
1014 in favor of the person, and if we
cannot change Pur system of appeals,
perhaps this suggestion can be the first
step in giving a new and greater hope to
those who seek the justice of the
ecclesiastical tribunal.
(6) Finally, unlike the common law
with which the lay advocate is familiar,
they find our law too strict and rigid.
There is little room for creativity. Like
the common law, they feel that canon law
ought to live and breathe and realistically
reflect the needs of our people within the
context of their existential experience.
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In conclusion we might inquire as to
the future of the lay advocate in our
judicial system. We in Pittsburgh are
unqualifiedly convinced of their importance and the great contribution which
they have made and will continue to
make to our sense of justice. In our first
meeting with the lay advocates, Bishop
Wright held out the hope that some day
some of these men and women would sit
as judges in our courts and even in the
position of officilia. At a recent symposium in New York where the possi-

bility of a constitution for the Church
was considered, it was recommended that
the only qualification for participation in
the judicial structure of the Church be
professional competency without any discrimination on the grounds of sex or
clerical status. In introducing lay advocates into our court, we feel that we in
Pittsburgh will be eminently prepared to
meet the challenge and hope of using
competent laymen in the total judicial
system of the Church.

DEFAMATION

of such a recommendation is essentially
a non-legal problem insofar as it involves
a delicate balance between the independence of the student writer and the unquestioned right of the institution to
protect itself. The difficulties involved,
however, do not lessen the need for
such a program.

(Continued)
arisen. To be effective and meaningful,
this advisor must be an active participant
in the day-to-day functioning of the
publication without, however, becoming an
overbearing censor. The implementation

